



Directorate of
Intelligence

MASTER FILE COPY

**DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON**

~~Secret~~

25X1

**Near East and
South Asia Review**

25X1

4 January 1985

~~Secret~~

**NESA NESAR 85-003
4 January 1985**

Copy **427**

Page Denied

~~Secret~~

25X1

**Near East and
South Asia Review**

25X1

4 January 1985

Articles		Page	
	Iraqi Foreign Policy: The Case for Postwar Moderation	1	25X1
			25X1
	The moderating trend in Iraqi foreign policy is likely to outlast the country's war with Iran, as Baghdad will need good ties with the moderate Arabs to counter continuing hostility from Iran and Syria and will seek more extensive political and economic ties with the United States and Western Europe to balance its ties with the East.		25X1
			25X1
	The Communist Party of Iraq	5	25X1
			25X1
	The Communist Party of Iraq continues to be weakened by factionalism, following years of ruthless repression by the ruling Ba'th Party, but Communist activities during the past year suggest a persistence that could lead to its resurgence under more favorable conditions.		25X1
			25X1
	India: Improving Military Capabilities Against Sri Lanka	9	25X1
			25X1
	The increased ethnic violence in Sri Lanka since mid-1983 has been the major catalyst leading New Delhi to expand its military strength in the south, although fears of increased foreign involvement in the Indian Ocean and a desire to provide better protection to outlying island territories have been contributing factors.		25X1
			25X1
	India: Discord in the Nuclear Community	13	25X1
			25X1
	The Indian nuclear community is deeply split, with differences over the technological direction of the program and even safety standards hinging largely on personal allegiances to present and past directors of the Department of Atomic Energy, and these differences have resulted in delays in the nuclear program.		25X1

~~Secret~~

Secret

25X1

Bangladesh: A Hot Winter for Ershad?

17

25X1
25X1

President Ershad is seeking to break Bangladesh's political stalemate by offering to hold a parliamentary election in early 1985 and proposing political concessions to win the opposition's participation, but the opposition is insisting on preconditions that are unacceptable to Ershad and his military backers.

25X1

Attitudes of Junior Pakistani Army Officers

19

25X1
25X1

Junior Pakistani Army officers have had more contact with the Islamic world than with the West and generally have come from a more religious background than senior officers, but most do not appear to differ substantially from their seniors about Pakistani policy toward the West and Islam.

25X1

Sudan: The Problems of Governance

21

25X1

The legitimacy of Sudan's ruler, or the popular acknowledgment of his right to govern, remains the central issue in Sudanese politics almost three decades after independence, and the leader's top priority is to retain power by controlling the security services and gaining support from factious northern elites.

25X1

25X1

Jiddah: Saudi Arabia's Second Capital

25

25X1
25X1

As a microcosm of the strains evident throughout Saudi society, Jiddah may serve as a bellwether for change throughout the Kingdom, and its future may reflect the government's ability to meet successfully the challenges posed by the marriage of modernity and tradition in Saudi Arabia.

25X1

25X1

Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors,

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Articles

**Iraqi Foreign Policy:
The Case for Postwar
Moderation**

25X1

The moderating trend in Iraqi foreign policy is likely to outlast the country's war with Iran. Baghdad will need good ties with the moderate Arabs to counter continuing hostility from Iran and Syria and to promote Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's aspirations to regional leadership. Iraq's desire for expanded political and economic ties with the United States and Western Europe is also likely to encourage moderation. Because of these considerations Iraq is unlikely to resort to terrorism against moderate Arab or Western states after the war. The USSR will remain Iraq's major arms supplier but is unlikely to be able to extract significant political concessions from Baghdad.

Iraq's desire to establish itself as a leader in the region and its sense of vulnerability between frequently hostile Iran and Syria have been major factors encouraging Iraqi moderation. Iraq began courting the Gulf Arabs and Jordan in earnest in 1978 as it sought to fill the leadership vacuum created by Egypt's isolation. In 1980 renewed hostility with Damascus and the emerging Iranian threat added impetus to Baghdad's efforts to improve relations with Arab moderates. Iraq particularly sought good ties with Jordan, partly as a counterweight to Syria, but primarily to ensure an economic lifeline through the port of Al Aqabah. Iraq loaned Jordan several hundred million dollars to improve the port.

25X1

Baghdad's attempts to play a broader regional role after the war will cause some problems in its relations with the moderate Arab states and the West. Iraq's leadership aspirations will revive its traditional rivalries with Cairo and Riyadh, which have ambitions of their own, but Baghdad probably will not allow such differences to jeopardize overall relations with them. Iraq will oppose US efforts to strengthen military ties with the Gulf states.

Baghdad's growing oil revenues and its desire to diversify its civilian and military trading partners also led it to expand ties with the West in the late 1970s. By 1980 Iraq was importing three-fourths of its civilian goods from non-Communist countries, up from about one-fourth in 1974, and Western countries were winning contracts for most major development projects. Baghdad also began turning to the West—particularly France—for military equipment, and by 1980 it was obtaining one-third of its arms and materiel from non-Communist countries, up from about 5 percent in 1974.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Background

Iraq has significantly moderated its foreign policy since the late 1970s. In the early and mid-1970s Iraq backed groups trying to subvert the conservative monarchies of the region, was a haven for radical Palestinian terrorist groups, and adopted the hardest line of any Arab state toward Israel. In 1978 Iraq led the move to isolate Egypt for subscribing to the Camp David accords.

Since the war with Iran began, Baghdad has softened its rejectionist stance toward Israel and recently began signaling its support for a Jordanian-PLO agreement on negotiations with Tel Aviv. Iraq has

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret

resumed dealings with Egypt and probably will fully normalize ties with Cairo in 1985. Baghdad also no longer allows international terrorist groups to operate out of Iraq. Last year it expelled Abu Nidal's Black June Palestinian terrorist group. [REDACTED]

of MIG-21s, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Postwar Moderation?

Some observers regard Iraq's moderation as purely expedient and believe Baghdad will revert to radical policies when the war ends. Iraq's need for Arab and Western support in the war has contributed to the moderating trend in its policies. Nevertheless, we believe the factors that have encouraged this trend will continue to play a major role in shaping Baghdad's postwar policies. [REDACTED]

Despite Iraq's reluctance to support Syria in a conflict with Israel, Baghdad remains hostile to Tel Aviv. This animosity is deeply rooted in the Iraqi leadership and populace. Moreover, Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 and its refusal to rule out a future strike have humiliated and infuriated the Iraqis. Should Israel become involved in a war with Jordan or Egypt, Iraq would commit substantial forces to support them. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Continued Iranian and Syrian hostility will strongly influence Iraq's position. Even after Khomeini dies and the war ends, the Iraqis are likely to be faced with a hostile clerical regime in Tehran. As long as the potential for renewed hostility with Iran exists, Iraq will need to keep open logistic lines through Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. This will force Baghdad to maintain reasonably good relations with the Arab moderates. [REDACTED]

Economic Concerns. The ability of Iran and Syria to shut down key Iraqi oil and supply routes has reinforced Baghdad's longstanding concern over the country's economic vulnerability. Iraq has relied heavily on financial aid from the Gulf Arabs in the war. They have provided over \$25 billion in direct aid and oil sales. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also have served as major transshipment points for military cargo, and Jordan's port of Al Aqabah has served as a crucial gateway for Iraqi civilian and military imports. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Syrian support for Iran in the war has deepened the longstanding hostility between Damascus and Baghdad. In 1981 Syria allowed Iran to use a Syrian airbase to stage an air raid on an Iraqi airfield that killed some Iraqi military personnel. [REDACTED]

The oil pipelines Iraq is building through Turkey and Saudi Arabia will link its interests more closely with the region's moderates and thus increase Baghdad's interest in their stability. Moreover, Iraq regards the Gulf regimes as fragile, according to US diplomats in Baghdad, and realizes that efforts to subvert them would be likely to play into the hands of Iran, which is working through the large communities of Gulf Shias to destabilize those states. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] This hostility is reinforced by the personal hatred between Saddam and Syrian President Assad. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Syrian actions make it likely that Iraq will step up efforts after the war to counter Syrian policies. To accomplish this Iraq is likely to continue to cooperate with Arab moderates who have supported it during the war. Moreover, in our judgment, Iraq would give only token support to Syria in the event of another conflict between Damascus and Tel Aviv. [REDACTED]

Iraq is determined to resume its ambitious economic development program and intends to rely primarily on Western companies. Western governments may be able to use Iraq's desire for expanded economic ties to encourage continued Iraqi moderation. [REDACTED]

25X1

Popular Opinion. Senior and middle-level personnel in the Ba'th Party and the military are not likely to look favorably on postwar adventurism. Iraqi Foreign

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Minister Tariq 'Aziz has told US diplomats the Iraqi people will not tolerate adventurist policies by the government after the sacrifices made fighting Iran. With some 300,000 Iraqi casualties in the war, according to our estimate, virtually every family in this country of 15 million has experienced the death or injury of a relative. The war has brought great economic hardship as well. Iraq has slashed civilian imports by almost half in the last two years. []

Leadership Aspirations. Iraq's aspiration to regional leadership will encourage Baghdad to maintain good ties with the Arab moderates. Saddam is likely to present Iraq as a protector of the Gulf and realizes that resuming its prewar support for opposition movements in the region would encourage the Gulf regimes to put distance between themselves and Iraq and draw closer to the West. Iraq will need moderate support to counter Syrian policies and probably hopes improved ties with Egypt and Jordan will increase its opportunities for influencing the Arab-Israeli peace process. []

Iraq's stance on Arab-Israeli issues is likely to be governed by its desire to thwart Syria. Iraq is likely to take a harder line on conditions for Jordanian-PLO negotiations with Israel, but it will try to avoid alienating the moderate Arabs with whom it will seek cooperation on other issues. Iraqi officials have told US diplomats they prefer an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Iraq probably believes that such a conference would enhance its chances of influencing the peace process. []

Looking to the United States. Iraq's interest in improved relations with the United States is likely to outlast the war. Iraq's decision to normalize relations reflects a basic tenet of Saddam's foreign policy—balanced relations with both the superpowers. Moreover, Iraq's large military and economic deals with the Soviets earlier in 1984 probably reduced fears by the more pro-Soviet members of the Iraqi leadership that better ties with the United States would damage relations with the USSR. []

Baghdad wants to expand trade and commercial ties, especially in the areas of agriculture and oil. []

[] Iraq is particularly interested in

acquiring US agrobusiness technology. Largely as a result of bureaucratic mismanagement of its land reform, Iraq has gone from agricultural self-sufficiency in the 1960s to net food importer today. []

Iraq also is likely to exploit improved ties by attempting to purchase US military equipment. Iraqi officers have been impressed with the performance of some US weapons during the war. Baghdad also may seek US help in acquiring arms from Western Europe. Since US arms are not crucial to Iraq, Baghdad will view Washington's responses to its requests primarily in political terms and as an indication of the US attitude toward the overall relationship. []

Finally, Saddam believes greater balance in relations with the superpowers will serve his goal of establishing Iraq as a leader in the nonaligned movement. The war prevented Iraq from acting as host to the nonaligned summit conference in 1982, and Saddam still wants to be host for the next one, scheduled for 1986. Moreover, Saddam probably believes improved ties with the United States will enhance Iraqi regional leadership by encouraging Arab moderates to cooperate with Baghdad. []

Mistrusting the Soviets

The USSR will continue to be Iraq's principal arms supplier but probably will not be able to extract significant political concessions in return. Even at the height of Iraqi dependence on Soviet arms in the mid-1970s Baghdad granted only token representation in the government to the Iraqi Communist Party. Moreover, Moscow's arms embargo early in the war and the poor performance of some Soviet equipment have convinced many Iraqi leaders that they should reduce their dependence on Soviet weapons after the war. []

Postwar Conflicts

Despite Iraq's desire for continued good ties with the Arab moderates, Baghdad's efforts to establish itself as a regional power are likely to bring it into conflict with its moderate allies and the United States on some issues. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Iraq probably will concentrate its ambitions on the Gulf and will want to participate in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Gulf states almost certainly will resist full Iraqi participation, fearing that linking themselves militarily to Iraq would anger Iran. Baghdad will push aggressively for membership in the GCC through diplomatic means, but it is not likely to resort to force to get its way. [REDACTED]

25X1

Kuwait is likely to bear the brunt of Iraqi ambitions. Baghdad will press Kuwait to resolve their longstanding border dispute and accede to Iraq's request to lease the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Al Warbah. Iraq is determined to gain territorial changes to strengthen the security of its developing naval and commercial port at Umm Qasr, opposite the islands. Following the war, Baghdad intends to expand significantly the Umm Qasr naval base and will use it as a berth for 10 warships purchased from Italy. Moreover, Iraq intends Umm Qasr to serve as a partial alternative to its major port at Al Basrah, which is more vulnerable to Iran. It has built a shipping canal connecting the ports, thus bypassing the Shatt al Arab [REDACTED]

25X1

Iraq's pursuit of regional leadership is likely to rekindle its traditional rivalry with Cairo. Egypt probably will be critical of Iraqi efforts to dominate the GCC, and frictions may develop as the two states vie for influence over Jordan. Baghdad is not likely to allow rivalry to develop into hostility, however, as long as Iraq is working to isolate Syria. [REDACTED]

25X1

Iraq probably will view US efforts to strengthen military ties with the Gulf states as a threat to its own aspirations as protector of the Gulf. Iraq also believes a large US presence in the Gulf would promote greater superpower rivalry that would be detrimental to its independent policies. Baghdad almost certainly would consider postwar US efforts to improve ties with Iran as a direct threat to Iraqi security. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

The Communist Party of Iraq [REDACTED]

25X1

The Communist Party of Iraq continues to be weakened by factionalism, following years of ruthless repression by the ruling Ba'th Party. Communist activities during the past year, however, suggest a persistence that could lead to its resurgence under more favorable conditions. [REDACTED]

The Iraqi Communists went underground in 1979 following widespread arrests, executions, and other harassment. They gave up two minor Cabinet posts and inclusion in the Progressive and Patriotic National Front, a grouping of Iraqi political parties that nominally runs Iraq. Since then most of the Communist Party leadership has remained in exile, and the party has been inactive, with the exception of guerrillas fighting in the mountains of northern Iraq. The Ba'thist-Communist rivalry has deep roots that go back to the bloody struggle for political power in the late 1950s and early 1960s. [REDACTED]

Estimates of Communist strength are tenuous because of the clandestine and fractious nature of the party.

[REDACTED] Communist Party strength inside Iraq and abroad at about 2,500. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Communists number 1,500 inside Iraq and little more than 1,000 abroad [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there are 600 members and 1,500 to 1,800 independent supporters in northern Iraq. [REDACTED] there are another 200 members in southern Iraq and 200 to 240 members abroad. Most other estimates put the number of exiles closer to 1,000. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Communists still possess organizational talents that have long worried the ruling Ba'thists.

[REDACTED] the party distributed large numbers of antigovernment leaflets clandestinely throughout Iraq on a single night last April. The tract called on former members to rejoin the party. [REDACTED]

The following month, 2,000 students of Mosul and Irbil Universities and the Technological Institute of Kirkuk participated in the most serious public demonstrations since the Ba'thists seized power in 1968. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] the participants as mostly Kurds and Communists who were protesting the summer callup of male students to active duty in Iraq's militia. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The approximately 800 Communist guerrillas in northern Iraq remain an irritant to the government. US diplomats in Baghdad report that Communist guerrillas, supported by the dissident Kurdish Democratic Party, continue armed attacks against government forces, loyal Kurdish tribesmen, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Kurdish dissident Jalal Talabani, who had agreed to a cease-fire with the government. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

A Party Divided

The Iraqi Communists show no signs of overcoming their divisions, a weakness that has plagued them since the founding of the party 50 years ago. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] there appears to be a growing divergence between the aging, ideologically committed party leadership, represented by Secretary General Aziz Muhammad and other Politburo members, and newer middle-level cadres who tend to be younger and more heavily represented in the larger Central Committee and in the guerrilla groups. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Several Communist guerrilla leaders call for armed struggle against the Iraqi Government and oppose efforts at reconciliation. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret

[] They blame the party's top leadership for joining the Progressive and Patriotic National Front in 1973 and making the party's overt apparatus vulnerable during the Ba'thist crackdown. These fighters also resent the risks that they are taking while the old leadership leads a life of perceived ease and inaction abroad. []

Other party elements are pressing the old guard to reconcile with Baghdad. []

In addition to polarity over strategy, the Communists are divided by religion and ethnic background. Most of the party's members are Kurds, Shias, and Christians rather than the Sunnis who dominate Iraqi politics. []

[] the task of blending the appeal of Kurdish nationalism and the Shias' distinctive ethnic identity into Communist doctrine creates recurring friction. []

Foreign Ties

Iraqi Communists have failed to receive sufficient foreign support to overcome their weaknesses. The party receives limited support from the USSR, Eastern Europe, Syria, South Yemen, and radical Palestinian groups. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

Secret

Secret

**Government Response**

Ba'thist leaders take the Communist threat seriously, recalling the bitter struggle with their ideological rivals in the 1950s and 1960s and the popular appeal of the Communists as late as 1978. [redacted]



The government has employed carrot-and-stick and divide-and-rule approaches to contain the party. [redacted]

[redacted] Iraq released about 200 Communist prisoners last year and called in former Communist official Hafiz al-Tukhmachi to discuss possible ministerial positions for tame Communists. Baghdad deals harshly with those who fail to cooperate, deterring prospective Communists and active members alike. [redacted]

[redacted] Iraq executed 152 Communist prisoners in late 1983, most of whom had been detained since 1980-81. [redacted]

Prospects

We believe that the Communists are unlikely to threaten Iraqi stability unless one or more of the following developments takes place:

- *A younger, more dynamic leadership emerges.*
[redacted] Secretary General Aziz Muhammad is 60 and has headed the party for 20 years. His leadership has usually been weak and indecisive, in our judgment.
- *The party concentrates its organizational talents on constructing a clandestine network in Iraq.* Even if the party is legalized, to be effective it must create an underground network divorced from the existing one, which has been compromised. Building on the present nets or relying on an overt structure would leave the party vulnerable to roundups by the security services.

- *Iraq's economy is unable to fulfill popular expectations.* [redacted] the party depicted itself in 1978 as the only political element genuinely concerned with improving the working and living conditions of the common Iraqi. It also attracted supporters and sympathizers through a clever campaign criticizing official corruption and human rights abuses. If the government cannot resume its development program after the war with Iran because of low oil revenues, the Communists are certain to try to exploit this weakness. Prospects for the Communists during the war are dim because their support for Iran and Syria undercuts their popular appeal.

- *The Soviets significantly increase support for the Communists with the aim of overthrowing Saddam.* We believe that this is highly unlikely over the next few years because Moscow appears satisfied with its relations with the Saddam regime and regards prospects for a Communist seizure of power as thin.



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

India: Improving Military Capabilities Against Sri Lanka [REDACTED]

25X1

A major military buildup is now under way in south India. In our view, increased Tamil-Sinhalese violence in Sri Lanka since mid-1983 has been the major catalyst leading New Delhi to expand its military strength in the south, although fears of increased foreign involvement in the Indian Ocean and a desire to provide better protection to outlying island territories have been contributing factors. Despite improved Indian capabilities and the likely continuation of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka over the next year, New Delhi probably will seek to maintain stability on the island through a mix of threat and persuasion rather than through military intervention.

[REDACTED]

25X1

Military Buildup

In the aftermath of the ethnic bloodletting in Sri Lanka in 1983, India's Defense Council, chaired by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, considered military options for dealing with another serious outbreak of violence on the island. [REDACTED]

The Air Force established a Southern Air Command with headquarters at Trivandrum this past summer.

25X1

[REDACTED] Its missions encompass maritime strike and reconnaissance support to the Navy. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Overhead photography indicates that Trivandrum can now accommodate large jet aircraft with the recent extension of its runway. New airbases and units are to be established along the southern coastline. [REDACTED]

25X1

Capabilities for Intervention

25X1


India, in our view, can successfully project a small combat force across the straits on short notice. As facilities and force levels in the south expand, Indian

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret



25X1

Secret

Secret

capabilities to intervene in Sri Lanka in even greater force will be possible. []

We estimate that the Navy's six modern Soviet landing ships and four Indian-built utility landing craft are capable of moving in a single lift one fully equipped combat battalion with some supporting armor. Each Soviet-built ship can carry 180 to 200 troops or 80 to 100 men with about six armored vehicles. The small Indian craft can hold 120 troops or one armored vehicle, according to the Indian press. []

The Navy is augmenting its amphibious lift capability. The first of three indigenously built large amphibious landing ships (LSTs) is now fitting out in eastern India, [] and overhead photography. We expect the LST to enter service sometime in 1985. It is longer and wider—and therefore should have a larger capacity—than the British LST it resembles, which has a lift capacity of up to 530 troops and either 20 helicopters or 16 tanks []

that India is getting a new LST from Poland in the near future. []

Naval exercises in eastern India in spring 1984 suggested that the Navy may have begun to establish India's first naval infantry force, although the evidence is still tentative. []

[] that the Navy has long wanted a brigade-size amphibious assault force, but up until this year only regular infantry and mechanized Army units are believed to have been used in annual amphibious training exercises. []

India has only a limited capability to airlift troops and supplies, a deficiency the Air Force is moving to correct by replacing its obsolete fleet of transports with two new Soviet planes. []

[] In addition, since July, India has received more than 12 of 98 AN-32 light transports on order, according to imagery. They are based at Agra, home of India's elite airborne brigade. []

The Southern Air Command is still a skeletal command and is unlikely to reach its full military potential for some time. Although fighters from the north could be quickly deployed to southern airfields in an emergency, we believe the Air Force will be slow to divert frontline aircraft on a permanent basis from the more strategically important air commands adjacent to the Pakistani border during the next year. Moreover, the creation of new airfield and maintenance facilities in the south with adequate support equipment and spare parts will take time. []

Sri Lankan Capabilities

Sri Lanka's 25,000 military forces (active duty and reserve personnel combined) can offer only token resistance to direct military intervention by India, in our view. They are primarily an internal security force—understaffed, ill equipped, and poorly trained and disciplined—according to US Embassy and [] assessments. The Army is lightly armed and has few armored personnel carriers, the Navy has only small patrol craft, and the Air Force has no combat aircraft. []

Continued Indian Concerns

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, like his mother, has publicly expressed concern over the deteriorating communal relations in Sri Lanka. The Indian Government has been under continual domestic pressure for the past 18 months to support Tamils in Sri Lanka, according to US diplomatic reporting. Rajiv has urged Sri Lankan leaders to try harder to reach a political settlement and undoubtedly is disappointed over the recent breakdown in the government's communal reconciliation talks. []

Although Sri Lankan President Jayewardene hopes to counter the growing insurgency through new arms purchases and better anti-insurgency training, Indian political leaders are skeptical of his government's ability to maintain order. Sri Lankan security forces have not been able to control the violence, and the level of insurgent activity is on the rise, according to US Embassy and press reporting. Repressive measures by government forces against Tamil

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

civilians in the northern part of the island, we believe, have given added momentum to the insurgency. [REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

Outlook

India is unlikely to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka over the next year, despite the likelihood of a continued high level of ethnic violence and little or no progress toward a political settlement. We believe New Delhi's most likely strategy toward Colombo will be to seek to maintain Sri Lanka's stability through a mix of threat and persuasion rather than through direct military intervention. New Delhi under newly elected Prime Minister Gandhi probably will continue to offer its diplomatic good offices to assist Colombo in resolving its ethnic problems. [REDACTED]

25X1

India probably would weigh in militarily only if violence on the island:

- Erupts into uncontrolled, islandwide bloodletting.
- Is not contained and spills over into southern India.
- Provokes a massive flow of refugees into India.
- Threatens to precipitate intervention by foreign powers.

As the preeminent power in South Asia, New Delhi's military strategy is founded on the premise that it has the right to intervene in the affairs of its smaller neighbors to protect what it considers to be its national and regional interests. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

India: Discord in the Nuclear Community [REDACTED]

25X1

The Indian nuclear community is deeply split. Differences over the technological direction of the program and even over safety standards hinge largely on personal allegiances to present and past directors of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and have resulted in delays in the nuclear program. We believe newly elected Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi may attempt to improve the DAE's performance by appointing a new chairman sympathetic to Rajiv's interest in Western technology and modern management techniques. [REDACTED]

Background

The Indian nuclear program, renowned as a Third World success, has been highly politicized by India's prime ministers. Both Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai tried to undermine the influence and diminish the achievements of the other through their appointments to the Department of Atomic Energy and use of publicity surrounding the programs. [REDACTED]

In 1978 Desai demoted Raja Ramanna, a favorite of Gandhi's and the architect of India's 1974 nuclear test, and appointed Homi Sethna, an advocate of civil nuclear power, as chairman of the DAE. Animosity between Sethna and Ramanna began with the 1974 test, a political showpiece that resulted in the cutoff of Western nuclear technology and which Ramanna kept concealed from Sethna until the last minute. [REDACTED]

In 1980 Gandhi reappointed Ramanna as director of Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), apparently reversing the emphasis on civil nuclear power that Desai had sought. In 1983 Ramanna became chairman of the DAE when Sethna retired, although we believe Gandhi retained Sethna as a personal nuclear adviser to maintain an alternative line to the nuclear establishment. These arbitrary shifts of nuclear advisers with different viewpoints and access to government officials promoted a deep-seated rivalry between Ramanna's pronuclear weapons group and Sethna's nuclear power advocates. Although the

DAE debate swirls around the personalities of these two men, the substantive issues go to the core of the nuclear program and will simmer even if one or both of India's leading nuclear figures should pass prematurely from the scene. [REDACTED]

25X1

Nuclear Weapons

Ramanna is a well-known proponent of a nuclear weapons program, but he apparently does not represent a majority within the nuclear community. [REDACTED]

25X1

Safety and Management

Ramanna and Sethna have clashed sharply and publicly over safety standards, with Ramanna questioning whether India can afford to observe the same high standards as Western countries. According to press reporting, disagreements between the two scientists delayed for two years the appointment of a regulatory body to lay down norms on safety measures. We believe the recent death of an engineer at the Kota heavy water plant underscores the need for high safety standards and highlights Ramanna's laxity on this point. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Other scientists worry about Ramanna's willingness to sacrifice safety and good management for personal loyalty. He violated a longstanding tradition of having an engineer counterbalance a scientist in the two most powerful positions in the nuclear establishment by


Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret

INDIA

ORGANIZATION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT



25X1

appointing P. K. Iyengar, a physicist and his good friend and protege, as director of BARC. Many engineers believe that, with two scientists guiding the power program, more problems will be created than solved, since they do not have a basic understanding of the intricacies involved in power plant operation. Iyengar's appointment stirred dissension at BARC, with nuclear officials openly critical of Iyengar and refusing to respond to his direction. []

According to Indian press reports, Indira Gandhi shocked the nuclear community when she accepted Sethna's retirement in August 1983 and gave his position to Ramanna. Ramanna's position was strengthened and Sethna's reputation tarnished when a committee appointed to investigate criticisms of the nuclear program appearing in the press indicted the performance of the DAE both in terms of performance and the technological route chosen. According to the US Embassy, the head of the investigative committee was close to Ramanna and had longstanding differences with Sethna. The report

went beyond its mandate and argued that India should switch to light water reactors obtainable from the USSR, a position that Ramanna supports. []

25X1

The US Embassy reports that BARC senior officials have stated that under Ramanna's administration the organization's name is "tarnished by its dismal performance, false claims of achievements, inspired leaks to the press, and near fratricidal warfare among factions." Gossip in Bombay scientific and professional circles details intramural bickering, favoritism in appointments, exile of scientists to meaningless work, and ineffective leadership. The professional staff complains that Ramanna hampers communication between scientists in his efforts to control the program. []

25X1

[] BARC and DAE officials believe the country's nuclear leadership may be in flux, and they are attempting to position


25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

themselves to take best advantage of the new political leadership in New Delhi. [redacted]



Self-Reliance

Indian nuclear officials are even taking sides over the longstanding policy of self-reliance, which dictates indigenously produced nuclear fuel and equipment. This policy took root in the late 1960s when India rejected the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to preserve its weapons option. [redacted]

The factions advocate nuclear self-reliance as a goal, but they disagree over how much to sacrifice for it. According to diplomatic sources, some members of the community believe India should retain its unsafeguarded facilities capable of producing explosive material. Nonetheless, they would accept limited safeguards over the power program that would open it to foreign observation but permit India to import the technology necessary to make it work more effectively. A very few would even sacrifice the weapons option in favor of the power program by accepting full-scope safeguards. [redacted]

A related disagreement is over which technology to import. Both Soviet and Western suppliers require some form of safeguards, but Ramanna is reputedly sympathetic to a Soviet offer of light water reactors. Employing these would divert the technological direction of the program away from heavy-water-moderated natural uranium reactors, which have failed to provide promised levels of energy under Sethna's civil power program. Presumably, Ramanna is willing to compromise on the goal of self-sufficiency to avoid similar criticisms of his own administration.

[redacted] most of the nuclear community believes Soviet technology is substandard. Some, including Sethna and the head of the Nuclear Fuel Center in Hyderabad, would prefer to import Western nuclear technology if safeguards requirements were not an obstacle. [redacted]

Outlook

In our judgment, the high profile of the nuclear establishment will bring it to the critical attention of Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi and his close advisers have a demonstrated interest in the business-oriented, high-technology world of the West and also see the West as a source of investment. Rajiv and his advisers are likely to ask for a reappraisal of the nuclear program, including the questions of self-reliance and its commitment to the large-scale civil nuclear program. This will have repercussions in the debate over the purchase of Soviet technology and may open the door for US and Western nuclear technology. [redacted]



25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Bangladesh: A Hot Winter for Ershad?

25X1

President Ershad is seeking to break Bangladesh's political stalemate by offering to hold a parliamentary election in early 1985 and proposing political concessions in return for the opposition's participation. The two opposition alliances have not rejected Ershad's offer but are insisting on preconditions that are, so far, unacceptable to Ershad and his military backers.

Ershad to Opposition: Let's Make a Deal

The main features of Ershad's 15 December proposal are:

- Parliamentary election to be held in April 1985.
- Most of the martial law offices to be dismantled by the end of January.
- Martial law to be phased out and suspended constitution to be reinstated once the parliament is seated.
- Election to be supervised by neutral election commission and government ministers to be banned from running as candidates.

Since then, the regime has also promised to restore basic political rights, stay neutral in the election, and remove government-backed Janadal Party members from the Cabinet before the election is held.

Ershad's proposals are the furthest he has gone in response to opposition demands. We judge that he is trying to persuade more moderate elements of the opposition alliances to endorse his election offer, thus dividing the opposition and giving the proposed election some legitimacy. At the same time, Ershad is trying to prove to the military that he is in control and that he can deal effectively with the opposition. Although US Embassy sources report that he retains the backing of most senior military officers—his tenure as commander in chief has been extended to December 1985—

Ershad, in our view, believes he can win the parliamentary election and then run for president himself.

Ball in Opposition's Court

So far, the two main opposition alliances, the Seven-Party Alliance and the Fifteen-Party Alliance, have sharply criticized Ershad's offer but have not rejected it outright. The Fifteen-Party Alliance, headed by the Awami League, has stipulated that martial law must be lifted before any election takes place and that Ershad must remain impartial during the election. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which heads the moderate Seven-Party Alliance, has called for a more gradual dismantling of martial law and for allowing former party leaders who were arrested for corruption to participate in the election. The Jamaat-e-Islami, the major fundamentalist organization, supports the opposition's demands and has held its own antigovernment rallies. The only major political party that has endorsed Ershad's offer is his own Janadal Party, which has little political credibility.

25X1

25X1

We believe both opposition alliances are hedging their bets in the hope of further concessions. It is unlikely that Ershad or the military will agree to lift martial law before the election or allow imprisoned BNP officials to run for office.

25X1

Ershad's election offer comes at a time when the opposition has become bolder in challenging the regime's authority. Since September both opposition alliances have engaged in civil disobedience, including general strikes, mass rallies, and "noncooperation movements" that seek to withhold tax payments to the government. The most recent action was a 48-hour general strike on 22-23 December that had wide participation, according to US Embassy reports, despite a temporary ban on political activity.

25X1

25X1

The continuing spiral of disobedience has been a source of

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret

embarrassment for both Ershad and the military. The election proposal was probably designed, in part, to break the spiral. [REDACTED]

Efforts To Break Stalemate

According to US Embassy sources, Ershad and his advisers have been negotiating with the BNP to secure its participation in the proposed election. The BNP is heavily factionalized, and Ershad hopes to exploit its divisions to attract proregime forces within the party. A major stumblingblock in this strategy, however, is the personal animosity of the BNP's leader, Begum Kaleda Zia, toward Ershad. Begum Zia, the widow of the late President Ziaur Rahman, holds Ershad responsible for her husband's assassination in 1981. [REDACTED]

A third choice would be to once again postpone the election, as Ershad did twice in 1984. Another postponement would increase military disgruntlement with Ershad's inability to consolidate his authority.

[REDACTED] many in both the military and the BNP believe that BNP leader Begum Zia would be more willing to negotiate with the regime if Ershad was replaced. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Unhappy Choices for Ershad

If most political parties refuse to take part in the proposed election, Ershad will be faced with several unpalatable choices. First, he could go ahead with the election in April with his Janadal Party and several conservative and Islamic breakaway factions of the BNP participating. The regime would probably use repressive measures to halt attempts to boycott or disrupt the balloting, but the credibility of such an election would be slight. [REDACTED]

25X1

Another option would be to hold a national referendum on Ershad's policies. The Fifteen-Party Alliance and the Jamaat-e-Islami, however, have already rejected this idea. [REDACTED]

25X1

Secret

Secret

Attitudes of Junior Pakistani Army Officers []

25X1

Junior Pakistani Army officers have had more contact with the Islamic world than with the West and generally have come from a more religious background than senior officers. Still, most junior officers regard the United States relatively favorably, and their views do not appear to differ substantially from their seniors about Pakistani policy toward the West and Islam. The junior officers are not fervent Muslims but appear to be more suspicious of India than senior officers and more interested in the current Turkish model of government, in which the military assumes an active role in leading the country. []

Background and Training

Junior Pakistani Army officers have had less contact with the West than senior officers. We estimate there were as many as 10 times more Western trainers in Pakistan and Pakistanis training in the West during the 1950s and early 1960s than there are today. []

Junior officers have had more contact with Arab military organizations than previous generations of Pakistani officers. According to [] open literature, the number of Pakistani military personnel stationed in the Middle East and North Africa has increased from 900 in 1972 to approximately 18,000—nearly 4 percent of all Pakistani armed forces personnel. In addition to its military training missions abroad, Pakistan's service schools, military bases, and ships serve as training centers for about 1,000 Arab military students at any one time. []

Junior officers have also been more exposed to Islamic influence through their families than senior officers. Since Pakistan's independence, many members of the Pakistani lower middle classes, where Islamic ties are strongest, have entered the Army as part of the []

threefold growth of the armed forces. [] the expansion of the Pakistani and Persian Gulf economies has made military service less attractive to Pakistan's more secular upper classes []

25X1

25X1

Views on Islam

25X1

Islamic fundamentalism is not a strong force among Pakistani junior officers. []

25X1

[] about 25 percent of the junior officers are fervent Muslims. About 50 percent are moderate supporters of Islam, and about 25 percent are secular in outlook. []

25X1

[] most junior officers dislike the religious fanaticism of the Khomeini regime. []

25X1

[] junior officers usually do not observe fasts during Ramadan and have ignored a recent order to pray several times a day. Other foreign military personnel note that young officers usually enjoy drinking alcohol while abroad. The US Embassy reports that questions about Islam take up insignificant space on exams at the Quetta Command and Staff College—a key steppingstone toward senior Army positions. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[] junior officers identify with the Islamic world and resent the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, but they have a somewhat condescending attitude toward Arabs, whom they consider to be poor fighters and primitive desert dwellers. This latter view is held particularly by those who have served in the Middle East. We believe that the young officers are jealous of Arab oil wealth and resent the fact that Pakistani workers perform menial jobs in the Arab Gulf states. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

The West and the USSR

Pakistani junior officers appear to be as pro-Western as their seniors despite less contact with the West. []

[] junior officers have a high regard for Western equipment []

25X1

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret

and are grateful for US military aid. Officers have enjoyed their training experiences in the West, and they prefer to vacation in the West rather than make a pilgrimage to Mecca. []

At the same time, junior officers—like senior officers—have negative feelings about the West and do not want to see Pakistan too closely tied to the United States. [] past US arms embargoes as well as US support for Israel have produced resentment. Both generations of officers believe that the United States may lose interest in Pakistan if concern about Afghanistan subsides. Neither generation wants US bases on Pakistani soil or extensive joint exercises. []

Both junior and senior officers dislike the Soviet Union. [] both generations of officers abhor Soviet atheism and resent the Soviet alliance with India. Many believe that the Soviets' ultimate goal is a naval base on the Pakistani coast. [] junior officers sometimes express frustration over President Zia's reluctance to deal forcefully with Afghan and Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace. We believe, however, that the junior officers would probably act in the same way if they were faced with command decisions. []

Tougher Attitude Toward India

Junior officers appear to have had less contact with Indians and hold a more negative view of them than do senior officers. Few officers under 40 have had more than sporadic encounters with Indians during trips abroad. Although they believe India is intent on dismembering Pakistan, junior officers do not underestimate the Indian military. They believe Pakistan would have trouble avoiding defeat in war. A handful of senior officers still in the Pakistani Army served with Indians in the British Indian Army, and most had many contacts with Hindus and Sikhs before partition in 1947. President Zia fought alongside Indian troops in the British Army in Burma.

[] these officers tend to see Indians in more human terms. []

Looking Toward Turkey

Junior officers appear to regard the Turkish military's active role in domestic politics favorably [] They believe []

Turkey has developed a successful system in which the military intervenes to reestablish order in times of unrest or government paralysis and sets the broad outlines of government policy during periods when civilians are in power. The younger officers have little faith in the ability of the old Pakistani establishment—landowners, politicians, lawyers, and bureaucrats—to solve Pakistan's problems or in the parliamentary and judicial systems inherited from the British. The officers believe that they have an obligation that transcends their military duties to their country. []

Outlook

The similarity of views between senior and junior officers about Islam, the West, and the Soviet Union indicates that Pakistan's military will probably continue to support a generally pro-Western, but at the same time nonaligned, stance. The junior officers' more suspicious attitude toward India, however, will work against both an improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations and probably against pressures to forgo a nuclear weapons program. []

We expect the attraction of the Turkish model will continue. Junior officers who come to power will probably be even more strongly inclined than senior officers are now to ensure stability either by direct rule or by insisting that a civilian government does their bidding. []

[]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Sudan: The Problems of Governance

25X1

Forecasting developments in Sudan is risky, but—as President Nimeiri's troubles in recent months attest—governing that country is riskier. Sudanese politics pit numerous factions against each other and frequently against a central government struggling to stay in power. Focusing on Nimeiri's mercurial personality or on foreign meddling may partly explain political outcomes in Sudan. This emphasis, however, neglects a major problem facing any Sudanese leader—how to get the various organized groups to accept his right to rule.

Challenges Facing the Government

The legitimacy of Sudan's ruler, or the popular acknowledgment of his right to govern and his ability to represent fairly the interests of diverse groups, remains the central issue in Sudanese politics almost three decades after independence. Sudanese heads of state lack undisputed authority on the basis of traditional tribal or clan custom because of the numerous ethnic, linguistic, and cultural divisions within the population. Neither President Nimeiri nor his predecessors have succeeded in portraying themselves as charismatic leaders like Muhammad Ahmad, the "Mahdi," whose piety and opposition to British rule a century ago earned him widespread allegiance. Moreover, spokesmen for Sudan's political elites have failed to devise a durable formula for sharing power, checking potential abuses of power, and arranging for orderly succession.

Northern Realities. In the predominantly Arab Muslim north, persistent rivalries among key groups help keep alive disputes over the President's right to rule. Traditional rivalry between the Ansar and Khatmiyyah sects limits the chance that a national leader who belongs to one of these groups will keep the loyalty of the other. The Muslim Brotherhood's longstanding call to transform Sudan into an Islamic state challenges Ansar and Khatmiyyah claims to national leadership. This challenge makes it hard for a Sudanese leader to build a stable coalition of

Muslim forces and, indeed, stiffens Ansar and Khatmiyyah opposition to the ruler if he appears to cooperate closely with the Brotherhood. Nimeiri's growing detachment from the Brotherhood and from policies it favors, together with his conciliatory gestures toward the Ansars, is intended partly to reduce just such opposition.

25X1

Rivalry between Muslim Brothers and Communists splits the ranks of Sudanese who seek fundamental political and economic change. Both these groups appeal to educated professionals, labor union members, and students. A government alignment with Communists eventually would prompt an opposing coalition of Muslim Brothers, Ansars, and, possibly, Khatmiyyahs.

25X1

25X1

Differences among northern elites over policy toward southern Sudan further complicate the ruler's legitimacy. Ansars and Muslim Brothers generally favor Islamization and Arabization of the south, but Communists, union members, and some influential Khatmiyyahs endorse a measure of southern autonomy and development. Consequently, a conciliatory policy toward the south diminishes conservative Muslim support for the government, while a hardline policy weakens the backing of "progressive" forces for the regime.

25X1

Longstanding disputes over Sudan's foreign relations also make it hard for the government to build a durable popular base. Ansars generally oppose close ties with Egypt because they remember Cairo's cooperation with Britain a century ago in crushing the nationalist government set up by their founder, the Mahdi. As a result, Ansars at a minimum are hesitant to support a pro-Egyptian Sudanese leader against his regional enemies. At a maximum, Ansars might cooperate with Egypt's regional opponents who want to weaken the bonds between Khartoum and Cairo.

25X1

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret

In contrast to the Ansars, Khatmiyyah elites generally support Sudanese leaders who cultivate close relations with Egypt. This stems from Cairo's preferential treatment of the sect dating back to the 1880s. The Khatmiyyahs, however, are more flexible than the Ansars in their position on foreign affairs, and they will seek any regional support necessary to retain their relative affluence and access to high-level government posts. []

Muslim Brothers tend to side with the Ansars against the Khatmiyyahs and a pro-Egyptian Sudanese government, largely because of Egypt's anti-Brotherhood policy dating from 1954. The Brotherhood's support for an evolutionary process of Islamization in Sudan, its fear of repression by an Egyptian-backed Sudanese regime, and the cooperation it has received from Nimeiri in recent years, however, make it cautious about openly challenging the government's policy. []

The Southern Problem. In the black, non-Muslim south a legacy of cultural belittlement, political domination, and economic neglect by northerners keeps key groups poised to oppose the leader in Khartoum. Southern elites trained in Christian missionary schools and in the West are more prone than animist chiefs to organize an insurrection and have filled most of the leadership roles in the main southern dissident organization, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement. Southern opposition increases if southern leaders perceive northern attempts to Islamize and Arabize the south, exploit southern resources, and impede southern autonomy. []

Southerners become more inclined to oppose the ruler if he appears to be aligning with fervent Muslim elements in Sudan and elsewhere in the region. Southerners fear that the growth of Islamic fundamentalism strengthens northern sentiments to oppress them. Moreover, most southerners believe that in a north-south crisis, Cairo would back Khartoum at the expense of southern interests to ensure its water supply from the Nile River. []

Tensions among the powerful Dinka, Nuer, and Lotuka tribes, however, limit southern cooperation. The Dinkas, the largest tribal confederation in the

south, and the Nuers are traditional rivals for leadership in the Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile Provinces. Lotukas and other tribes in Equatoria, meanwhile, are suspicious of the Dinkas and resent Dinka attempts to gain preeminence in southern politics. These frictions—if exploited by the central government—can weaken a southern dissident movement. []

Economic Issues. Sudanese elites outside the government always link, to some degree, the regime's legitimacy to its economic performance. Opposition increases if development projects fail and if droughts and fluctuations in world market prices for Sudanese cotton reduce foreign exchange earnings and diminish the regime's ability to provide basic goods and services. The more a ruler excludes key elites from the policymaking process, the greater will be his blame for a faltering economy. []

The economic expectations of urban professionals, trade unionists, and students in the north are especially troublesome for a Sudanese regime. These groups—though split along sectarian and ideological lines—can paralyze important services and organize demonstrations if they believe the government is incompetent or corrupt. []

The Military. The military's support for a Sudanese regime depends largely on a combination of:

- The soldiers' satisfaction or disgruntlement, on a personal level, with their pay and perquisites and, on a professional level, with their equipment, training, and self-esteem.
- The regime's economic policies, to the extent that they prevent or provoke civil disorder.
- The regime's handling of the southern problem. []

Senior officers have the most privileges and thus the most to lose by involvement in an abortive coup. They might not move to save the ruler, however, if they faced mounting disciplinary problems in the ranks, civilian riots in Khartoum, and a military stalemate in the south. []

Lower ranking officers, who lack the financial cushion of their senior colleagues, tend to be more sensitive to

25X1
25X125X1
25X1

25X1

25X1
25X125X1
25X1

Secret

Secret

corruption and budgetary mismanagement. Their disaffection will increase if government policy heightens resistance in the south, where they are obliged to fight in harsh terrain with poor equipment and inadequate logistic support. [REDACTED]

The Ruler's Responses

The Sudanese leader knows that his country's heterogeneity severely limits his legitimacy and keeps his tenure uncertain. His top priority, therefore, is to retain power by controlling the security services and gaining support or at least neutrality from factious northern elites. This task consumes most of his time and political resources, leaving little for economic planning and state building. [REDACTED]

Mixing intimidation with rewards is a frequently used Sudanese strategy for retaining power. A ruler in Khartoum will foster insecurity among his senior officials, especially if he gains office through a coup. For example, to discourage competitors and encourage dependence on his patronage, Nimeiri arbitrarily rotates his officers, transferring them from posts of prominence to obscurity or retiring them. Nonetheless, he avoids liquidating the "disloyal" out of respect for the Sudanese distaste for political violence and to avoid emboldening desperate opponents. [REDACTED]

Nimeiri appears to find the "carrot-and-stick" approach irresistible for making or breaking civilian coalitions. Offering posts and favorable economic decisions to one group while threatening to curtail its political activity may temporarily split, for example, Ansars from Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri's recent decision to end the 15-month imprisonment of Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi conforms to this strategy. [REDACTED]

Nimeiri's maintenance of a political organization supplements his carrot-and-stick strategy. An authoritarian "mass" party such as the Sudan Socialist Union serves to co-opt opponents through membership or publicize their abstention as a lack of civic responsibility. Through the single party, Nimeiri can portray himself as receptive to broad political participation while retaining some influence over any elites who join. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

Secret

Secret

**Jiddah: Saudi Arabia's
Second Capital**

25X1



and are bused to Mecca with their "mutawwif," a Saudi Government-approved guide required of all foreign pilgrims. The Hajj terminal was first opened to pilgrimage traffic in 1982, and in 1984 over 35,000 pilgrims a day were processed at the peak of the Hajj season.

25X1

The City

From the airport, Jiddah is due south along Mecca Road—a six-lane highway jammed during weekday rush hours and on Friday evenings, which is the end of the Saudi weekend. Both sides of Mecca Road are lined with large retail stores, office buildings, small shops, and restaurants. Closer to town, there are larger, Western-style shopping malls where small groups of teenage Saudi boys and girls gather in the evenings to flirt discreetly in what has become a new courting ritual in Jiddah. "Cruising" along Mecca Road during congested hours also is popular among young Saudi men as a way to catch glimpses of unveiled Saudi and Western women in other cars.

the Hajj—the annual pilgrimage when Muslims from all over the world travel to Mecca (about 70 kilometers west of Jiddah) to perform their religious obligation—the recently completed Hajj terminal adjacent to King Abd al-Aziz airport The air-conditioned, open, tentlike structure is the processing point for all pilgrims arriving in the Kingdom by air. The terminal is divided into two sections, which allows the Saudis to separate potentially hostile pilgrimage delegations, such as Iranians and Iraqis. The pilgrims are grouped together at the terminal by nationality or language

25X1

Mecca Road winds its way to the suq—the market or bazaar—that is the center of the city and still Jiddah's shopping hub. It is here that the gold shops abound and Saudi and expatriate shoppers bargain in traditional fashion with the local merchants. Most of the shopkeepers are Yemenis, mainly from South Yemen, who rent their shops from Saudi landlords. According to the local shopkeepers, Prince Muhammad bin Abd al-Aziz, King Fahd's eldest brother, owns most of the property of the central suq.

25X1

The area surrounding the suq is downtown Jiddah, and it resembles many other large cities in the Middle East. Crowded and congested, the area has undergone a transformation during the past few years as older buildings from the turn of the century have been torn down and replaced by modern structures, mainly large office buildings. Although the Saudi

25X1

Secret

NESA NESAR 85-002
4 January 1985

Secret

Government recently has taken steps to preserve some of Jiddah's traditional buildings, years of indiscriminate leveling of city blocks have changed the face of the inner city.

The southern edge of the city is ringed by an oil refinery and the port of Jiddah. King Faysal Naval Base is a short distance farther south. King Abd al-Aziz University and the old airport stretch along Jiddah's western perimeter. The escarpment, which is the western side of a mountain range running the length of the Hijaz (the western region of Saudi Arabia), provides a dramatic backdrop to the city in the east.

The western edge of the city has been edging into the Red Sea. Soaring real estate prices and a shortage of undeveloped property in prime city locations have encouraged the Saudis to push out Jiddah's shoreline over the past 10 years. In some areas, as much as 2 kilometers of coastline have been reclaimed by landfill. The US Consulate compound in Jiddah once straddled the shoreline but is now located about a kilometer from the present corniche. The corniche itself has undergone significant development as the municipality has allocated nearly \$500 million over the past five years to beautify a 70-kilometer stretch of the city's coast. The corniche is very popular with both Saudis and expatriates, especially on weekend afternoons when the beaches are inundated by picnickers. Social and legal proscriptions against mixed swimming and Western-style beach attire, however, have encouraged most of Jiddah's Westerners—as well as Westernized Saudis and other Arabs—to congregate at more remote enclaves such as the "Creek," which is a small inlet north of the city where Riviera fashions and lifestyles prevail.

The People

Saudis. There are approximately 1.2 million people living in Jiddah, but only about half are Saudis. Most Saudis living in Jiddah are native Hijazis, inhabitants of the western region of the Kingdom who are of mixed ancestry and who are considered ethnic hybrids by their Najdi (central region) cousins. They are frequently referred to disparagingly as "baqiyyat al-hujjaj" (remnants of the pilgrims), as many of their forefathers originally came to Saudi Arabia on

pilgrimage and then remained. Many prominent Saudis from Jiddah (including the mayor) have ethnic Persian, Turkish, and Pakistani surnames.

According to an Embassy assessment, about three-fourths of the Saudis in Jiddah belong to the upper and middle classes. Although there is great economic disparity within this group, from multibillionaire businessmen to junior government officials, all are able financially to live comfortably. The standard of living is high by Western standards. Many families own several cars, usually new and expensive models. Most own their own homes. All children attend school, an increasing number through the university level. Family members frequently travel abroad, many for extended periods.

The remaining Saudis of Jiddah (approximately 150,000) constitute the "lower class." Lower class Saudis typically earn less than \$1,500 per month. It is not unusual for a family, or extended family, of eight to 10 members to live in a three-room dwelling. Some of these Saudis are taxicab drivers, government clerks, policemen, and National Guardsmen. Few adults are educated, and many are illiterate. Less than half have traveled outside the western region of the Kingdom, and many are dark skinned, indicating African ancestry. Most of these lower class Saudis are recent arrivals to Jiddah. Born in nearby rural areas, the Asir highlands, or the Tihama (Jizan) coastal plain, they have relocated to take advantage of better economic opportunities.

The Embassy believes the members of Jiddah's lower class, despite their low social and economic standing, are significantly better off than most Saudis who live in rural areas. Medical services are readily available in Jiddah and are free to Saudi citizens. Virtually all families own a car, and most have electricity and associated appliances, such as color television sets. Basic Western-style commodities are also affordable to most. Although malnutrition exists, it is due to poor dietary habits rather than an inability to buy nutritious foods. According to the Embassy, there are no homeless Saudis in Jiddah.

Secret

Non-Saudis. The other half of Jiddah's inhabitants are other Arabs, Africans, Asians, West Europeans, and Americans. Some of these non-Saudis, particularly the Arabs and some Africans, have lived in Jiddah for 20 years or more and are permanent residents of the city. The average stay for most Asians, Europeans, and Americans, however, is five years or less.

Although some expatriates—including almost all of the 50,000 Europeans and Americans who reside in the city—are professionals working in both the public and private sectors, most are menial laborers who accept unskilled or semiskilled jobs that traditionally are shunned by Saudis. They typically live in ethnic enclaves in the city or in foreign worker compounds attached to project sites. Some, especially Muslim Africans, are pilgrims remaining illegally in the country. Among the poorest non-Saudis are those from the Yemens, Sudan, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. Almost all of these groups live under conditions comparable to or below Saudi lower class standards. North Yemenis, the largest single group, are relatively better off, as they are granted special immigration and work privileges.

The Life

Jiddah is by far the most cosmopolitan of all Saudi cities. Although the trappings of modernization and Westernization can be found virtually anywhere in the Kingdom, Jiddah has had a longer exposure to outside influences. As the major port of entry for pilgrims as well as the diplomatic capital of the Kingdom for over 50 years (the government directed that all embassies be relocated to Riyadh last October), Jiddah has served as Saudi Arabia's melting pot.

Notwithstanding the city's reputation for relative social "liberalism," the same strictures that exist throughout Saudi Arabia are enforced in Jiddah. Women are not allowed to drive and can legally work only in positions deemed proper by the government and religious establishment, such as teaching and the medical professions. Unaccompanied women cannot check into a hotel without written government authorization. Public displays of affection between men and women—for example, holding hands—are prohibited. Alcohol is illegal. Public movie theaters

are proscribed by law, although several existed in Jiddah during the reign of King Faysal (1962-75). Restaurants are required to have one dining facility for families and another for men, and all commercial establishments must close during prayer times. All of these strictures apply to both Saudis and expatriates living in the Kingdom.

The recent rise in Islamic "awareness" in the Middle East and the concomitant trend toward greater social and religious conservatism throughout Saudi Arabia has prompted local officials in Jiddah to take additional steps to stem what the government believes are the politically unhealthy effects of Westernization. In the past two years, Jiddah's hairdressing salons for women and video game parlors have been closed, all common public gatherings of men and women have been banned, and censorship standards have been made more stringent. Nevertheless, the active enforcement of these religiously motivated laws is less rigorous in Jiddah than in other large cities. Although Jiddah has its own contingent of "mutawwa'in"—religious police who serve as sidewalk vigilantes—their activities pale in comparison to those of their brethren in Riyadh and Dhahran.

Violation of these social strictures is theoretically punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, but there are varying standards of justice in Jiddah. If a prominent Saudi is involved, the violation is generally regarded as an "indiscretion" and is overlooked. If it is an "average" Saudi with little influence among local officials, he is assessed a nominal fine and given a warning against any repetition. Non-Saudis, however, particularly Asian and African laborers, are shown little leniency and usually bear the full weight of Saudi justice. In any case involving non-Saudis, however, royal family members or other influential Saudis can alter the sentence.

The Government

Three levels of Saudi government—local, provincial, and national—are involved in the governing and development of the city of Jiddah. The local government, headed by Mayor Muhammad Said Farsi, has been responsible for cleaning up and

Secret

modernizing the city over the past five years. A protege of King Fahd, Farsi frequently uses heavyhanded and intimidating tactics on residents of Jiddah who oppose his plans for the city. Farsi is best known for his penchant for erecting eccentric monuments throughout the city, such as a 12-meter bicycle and a 6-meter thumb.

Jiddah also is the seat of government of Mecca Province, which is headed by Prince Majid bin Abd al-Aziz, a half brother of King Fahd, who lives in Jiddah. Majid and Farsi have locked horns in the past because of conflicting views regarding the city's development. Majid has prevented Farsi from enacting some of his programs, particularly plans for razing entire city blocks to make way for modern buildings and improved roads. Moreover, the governor has frequently sided with local residents against the ambitious mayor.

Although the summer capital of the Saudi Government is in Taif, which is about 100 kilometers east of Jiddah, most Saudi kings—including King Fahd—have spent at least half of their summers in Jiddah. King Fahd and most senior princes have large palaces in Jiddah and bring their families and staff with them during the summer months as well as on an irregular basis during the rest of the year. Many government officials also make the annual trek to the western province, and some maintain homes in both Riyadh and Jiddah. Consequently, the royal family and the national government keep a close eye on life in Jiddah.

Outlook

The city of Jiddah will continue to expand. Although much of the Kingdom's economic and diplomatic activity is gradually being transferred to Riyadh, Jiddah will remain an important commercial and financial center. Its proximity to Mecca, its more relaxed social environment, and its Red Sea location make it a more attractive home than Riyadh for many Saudis and most expatriates.

Over the next several years, however, Jiddah probably will experience classic urban maladies that could have political implications:

- The city will continue to attract poor and uneducated Saudis from rural areas. The result will be a steady increase in the size of Jiddah's lower class neighborhoods.
- The Kingdom's decreased oil revenue has resulted in a slowing of the city's development. In Jiddah, the result has been a smaller pie for more people. Consequently, many of the inflated expectations of urban youth will not be fulfilled.
- The city's heterogeneity has caused tension between Saudis and non-Saudis. Saudis blame the recent increase in the city's crime rate on the growing number of expatriates. Strains between the two groups probably will increase as expatriates provide scapegoats for Saudis dissatisfied with developments in Saudi society.
- Contrasts between modernity and tradition are more apparent in Jiddah than in any other Saudi city. Jiddah's native liberalism is contrary to the Kingdom's recent trend toward greater social and religious conservatism. Tensions between "modernists" and "traditionalists" are on the rise, and manifestations of this tension could develop.

As a microcosm of the strains evident throughout Saudi society, Jiddah may serve as a bellwether for change throughout the Kingdom. Moreover, Jiddah's future may reflect the government's ability to meet successfully the challenges posed by the marriage of modernity and tradition in Saudi Arabia.



25X1

Secret

Secret

Secret